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Abstract
Objectives: The current study contributes to the literature through a
systematic social observation of the defensive actions of drug sellers within
open-air retail markets. The study expands upon previous literature by
incorporating a novel data collection and coding method. Methods: Video
footage of narcotics transactions was extracted from the closed-circuit
television (CCTV) system of the Newark, NJ Police Department. Research-
ers transcribed and coded the footage to measure the frequency of defen-
sive actions incorporated by drug sellers. Fisher’s exact tests measured
whether the frequency of each defensive action significantly differed across
geographic setting or time of day. Results: The frequency of many defensive
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actions was significantly related to geographic setting and time of day. The
strongest relationship was observed between the use of stash spots and set-
ting. Overall, the findings suggest that drug sellers adopt tenets of Oppor-
tunity Theory to protect themselves from law enforcement, specifically by
acting as guardians and place managers on their own behalf. Conclusions: This
study extends prior techniques and provides an additional case study on the
use of CCTV footage in the study of street-level crime. This methodology
can be used in concert with more traditional ethnographic techniques in the
study of the drug trade and in crime-and-place research in general.
Keywords
drug selling, systematic social observation (SSO), CCTV footage, mixed
methods, situational crime prevention
Introduction
Perhaps no street-level crime occurs in as conspicuous a manner as public
drug selling (Jacobs 1999). The very nature of the crime requires both
buyers and sellers to be publicly, and continuously, accessible to one
another. This mutual accessibility sustains drug markets by ensuring that
participants can easily locate one another and engage in the transaction.
Ironically, while accessibility is key to the process, ‘‘the more accessible
a participant is, the less security he or she has’’ (Eck 1995:72). In response
to this vulnerability, drug offenders incorporate a number of defensive
tactics to avoid detection and apprehension by police. Research has con-
sistently found that such strategies effectively shield drug sellers from law
enforcement action.
The current study contributes to the literature on the defensive tactics of
drug offenders, specifically drug sellers within open-air retail markets. We
extracted video footage of the moments preceding, during, and following
narcotics transactions from closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras oper-
ated by the Newark, NJ Police Department (NPD). Through systematic
social observation (SSO), researchers transcribed and coded this footage
to analyze the defensive actions of the drug sellers observed on camera.
Findings suggest that drug sellers incorporate an array of defensive actions,
and the frequency of such actions is commonly influenced by geographic
setting and time of day. The nature of seller actions suggests that situational
factors, as articulated by Opportunity Theory (i.e., Rational Choice and
Routine Activities), directly influence public drug selling strategies.
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Review of Relevant Literature
Theoretical Framework
Contemporary research on street-level drug selling (e.g., Eck 1995;
Jacques and Reynald 2012; Jacques and Wright 2011) has been grounded
within the Rational Choice and Routine Activity perspectives of crimin-
ology (Cohen and Felson 1979; Cornish and Clarke 1986). Rational
Choice recognizes offender decision-making as a key determinant of
crime occurrence. This emphasis on decision-making forces criminolo-
gists to distinguish between offender criminality and distinct criminal
events (Clarke 1997). Even if an individual is criminally active, gener-
ally speaking, his or her participation in crime is determined on a case-
by-case basis. Only when the potential rewards outweigh the risks will
an individual choose to offend. While such decisions typically occur in
a state of bounded rationality constrained by limited time and informa-
tion, the offender nonetheless ponders the situation at hand (Clarke and
Cornish 1985).
The framing of the drug trade through the Rational Choice perspective
raises some intriguing questions. A rich body of literature highlights the
vulnerability of street-level drug sellers, particularly due to the necessity
for drug sellers to be publicly accessible to buyers (Adler 1993; Agar
1973; Eck 1995). While such accessibility maximizes profits through the
facilitation of seller–buyer interactions, it brings the consequence of mak-
ing drug sellers susceptible to detection and sanction. Thus, if offending is
the result of a decision-making process, why would drug sellers consider
the rewards to be worth the risks in such a vulnerable situation? This par-
adox is better understood once Rational Choice is considered alongside
Routine Activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979). Routine Activities
theory considers crime incidence as the outcome of the spatial and tem-
poral convergence of three elements: a likely offender, a suitable target,
and the absence of a capable guardian. In applying these perspectives to
the drug trade, Jacques and Wright (2011:738) referred to Rational Choice
and Routine Activities as ‘‘theoretical siblings’’ that rely on each other to
make accurate predictions. Even when offenders wish to engage in crime,
they cannot act upon their desires outside of the appropriate situation, as
determined by the routine activities of the participants (Felson and Clarke
1998). For drug offenders, while their trade requires exposure and vulner-
ability, the opportunity structure created through the routine activities of
involved parties minimizes risk enough that crime commission is worth
the potential reward.
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Opportunity Theory and the Prevention of Drug Selling
In the crime prevention arena, Rational Choice and Routine Activities have
been jointly considered (along with Crime Pattern Theory; Brantingham
and Brantingham 1981) as ‘‘Opportunity Theory’’ (Felson and Clarke
1998). As opposed to traditional criminological theories, which focus on
what makes people ‘‘criminal,’’ Opportunity Theory focuses on the imme-
diate situational causes of crime events (Clarke and Eck 2005:section 8).
Scholars have incorporated the tenets of Opportunity Theory in the concep-
tualization of the problem analysis triangle (Hough and Tilley 1998), an
analytic device ‘‘intended to help analysts visualize crime problems and
understand relationships among the three elements’’ of crime causation: the
target(s), the offender(s), and the place of occurrence (Braga 2008:3). A
more recent advancement of the triangle suggests specific avenues of focus
for crime prevention strategies, specifically by emphasizing the role of con-
trollers (Clarke and Eck 2005). Traditionally, Routine Activities empha-
sized the roles of two controllers: guardians who protect suitable targets
and handlers who are in a position to exert control over potential offenders
(Felson 1986). Eck (1994) extended the concept of controllers to include a
third type, place managers, who can influence the activities of a specific
environment in a manner that discourages crime. As described by Felson
(1995), Eck’s (1994) extension of the controller concept presents crime
opportunity as two triplets. The first triplet presents the three elements of
crime (target, offender, and amenable place), while the second triplet pre-
sents the controllers that exert influence over each of these elements (guar-
dians, handlers, and place managers).
The tenets of Opportunity Theory have contributed to the development
of effective crime control strategies, specifically situational crime preven-
tion (Clarke 1980, 1997) and problem-oriented policing (Goldstein 1979,
1990). These strategies have mitigated drug selling by focusing the actions
of controllers in a manner that directly addresses the situational character-
istics of drug markets. For example, in Jersey City, NJ, police (guardians)
developed a problem-oriented drug enforcement approach followed by a
patrol maintenance program at targeted drug markets (Weisburd and Green
1995; Weisburd et al. 2006). In High Point, NC, a focused-deterrence strat-
egy coordinated the activities of influential community members and pro-
secutors (handlers) to coerce drug sellers into abandoning the drug trade
(Corsaro et al. 2012; Kennedy and Wong 2009). In Oakland, CA, crime-
control activities and cohesiveness of code enforcement officers, business
personnel, and neighborhood residents (place managers) were significantly
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associated with decreased levels of drug and disorder activity on targeted
street blocks (Mazerolle, Kadleck, and Roehl 1998).1
Opportunity Theory and Offender Threat Management:
Defensive Actions of Drug Sellers
Opportunity Theory provides a powerful framework to explore situational
aspects of crime and crime prevention. Interestingly, recent research has
found that the tenets of Opportunity Theory also explain strategies used
by offenders in their management of sanction threats. Obviously, the obser-
vation that offenders take precautions to prevent sanction is not new, with
researchers reporting such findings in the 1930s and 1940s (Sutherland
1937; Whyte 1943). However, recent research has shown that such offender
precautions generate from the same situational underpinnings as crime-
prevention efforts. Jacques and Reynald (2012) provided an illustration in
the context of the illicit drug trade. Through qualitative data from drug sell-
ers, Jacques and Reynald (2012) demonstrated that the actions of offenders
strictly adhered to the opportunity-reducing techniques of situational crime
prevention, similar to the actions taken by law-abiding citizens. The obser-
vations of Jacques and Reynald (2012) enjoy a great deal of support, as prior
research has noted similar defensive actions among drug sellers.
A popular tactic among drug sellers involves the use of partners in drug
transactions. While a primary seller oversees the operation, and ultimately
manages proceeds from sales, other people fill specific roles. Certain indi-
viduals transport the drugs and/or money between drug sellers and buyers.
Referred by such terms as middle men, go-betweens, or runners (Johnson
and Natarajan 1995; Moskos 2008), such individuals allow drug sellers to
avoid (or reduce) direct contact with buyers, thus minimizing sellers’ expo-
sure to law enforcement activity. In such arrangements, these partners only
receive from the seller the precise quantity of drugs paid for by the buyer,
meaning their arrest typically results in minor charges (Johnson et al. 1985).
A second type of partner frequently observed in the literature is lookouts,
persons who watch for the presence and/or approach of police officers
(Jacobs 1999; Johnson and Natarajan 1995). Finally, research has found that
sellers use partners to hold their narcotics inventory or proceeds from trans-
actions (Johnson and Natarajan 1995; Moskos 2008). While sellers conduct
the transactions in such instances, this arrangement allows them to operate
while possessing minimal quantities of narcotics and proceeds.
As for the actual exchange of drugs and money, sellers have reported the
use of several transactional mediation schemes (Jacobs 1999) meant to
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obscure the occurrence of the transaction. The first type of mediation
scheme involves the use of props- the placing of drugs or money in an
object for delivery purposes. Examples of props include sellers placing
drugs inside of objects such as folded newspapers (Jacobs 1999:89),
crumbled paper bags (St. Jean 2007:119-20), and other miscellaneous forms
of litter (Johnson and Natarajan 1995:59) for a buyer to pick up after pay-
ment. Props allow sellers to make transactions without the use of potentially
conspicuous hand-to-hand exchanges. A second type of scheme is public
cuts, which refer to publicly accessible places that have a somewhat private
dimension by being partially obscured from sight (Jacobs 1999:91). Public
cuts include places such as alleyways, basement pits, or spaces between
buildings. Cuts provide sellers quick cover for transactions without leaving
the drug market. In addition, since undercover police officers need to main-
tain visible contact with their backup teams, sellers often believe that under-
cover officers are reluctant to enter cuts (Jacobs 1999). A somewhat related
scheme, which we refer to as legitimate context, involves sellers using legit-
imate features of the drug market to give the impression that they are
involved in licit activities during their transactions. For example, Jacobs
(1999) reported that sellers would often sell from within fast-food restau-
rants to appear like customers, while St. Jean (2007) found that dealers pre-
ferred to operate around transit stops to give the impression that they were
waiting for public transportation.
Sellers may conduct different phases of the transaction at different places
within the drug market in an attempt to obscure the transaction (Johnson
and Natarajan 1995). Such a strategy makes it difficult for police to prove
that ‘‘geographically and temporally distinct transactions . . . were some-
how related to the same sales transaction event’’ (Johnson, Dunlap, and
Touringy 2000:29). For example, a seller and buyer may exchange currency
at one location and then walk to another location for the purpose of conduct-
ing the exchange of drugs. By separating the components of the transaction,
offenders obscure the exchange, to a certain extent.
A particularly popular defensive tactic reported in prior research is the
use of stash spots, which are ‘‘secret places for keeping ones’ drugs, guns,
money, or other desirable object’’ (Jacques and Reynald 2012:282). Stash
spots help sellers minimize the probability of being caught with drugs on
their person, while also minimizing the likelihood of having significant
quantities on them in the event that they are caught (Jacobs 1999; Moskos
2008). Stashes are typically kept in an environmentally hidden area close by
the seller’s location, allowing for quick access when needed (Jacobs 1999;
Jacques and Reynald 2012; Johnson and Natarajan 1995). Research has also
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found that drug sellers use on-person stash spots by holding drugs within
areas of their person not easily detected during a police stop, such as in
shoes, socks, and inside of underwear (Jacobs 1999). While the drugs are
still in the seller’s possession in such instances, the stash is not as vulnerable
as when drugs are kept in easily found areas, such as a pants or jacket
pocket.
Finally, research has found that drug sellers manipulate the speed at
which transactions occur. The motivations for different transaction speeds
are contextual, with both quick and delayed transactions providing benefits
to the seller. On the one hand, hasty transactions may indicate efforts to
avoid apprehension through rapid completion of the criminal act (Gill and
Loveday 2003). However, research has also found that sellers oftentimes
deliberately delay transactions to allow more time to verify that they
received the proper amount of currency and/or that the buyer is not an
undercover officer before surrendering the drugs (Jacobs 1993, 1999;
Jacques and Reynald 2012).
Scope of the Current Study
The extensive research on drug selling has contributed greatly to our under-
standing of the defensive tactics incorporated into the drug trade. However,
it should be noted that offenders themselves have largely reported such
information during interviews. Findings can be compromised if offender
accounts are dishonest or embellished in certain respects. To be sure,
researchers are well aware of this and report the use of various controls
to minimize threats to validity, such as conducting follow-up interviews
later in time (Williams 1992), probing unusual comments to determine
accuracy (Jacques and Wright 2011), and using data saturation, an indicator
of how useful the sample is for indicative knowledge, to determine when
data from various sources confirm overarching themes (Coomber and
Maher 2006). However, as noted by Jacques and Wright (2011:741), such
safeguards do not eliminate the possibility that subjects lied or embellished
their accounts.
Irrespective of the truthfulness of research subjects, more direct observa-
tions of drug seller tactics would significantly contribute to the literature.
As argued by Sampson and Raudenbush (1999:606), ‘‘direct observation
is fundamental to the advancement of knowledge.’’ However, it should
be acknowledged that most research has relied on secondhand accounts for
good reason. Since they engage in inherently illegal behavior, drug sellers
do not readily allow third parties to view their operations. Researchers in
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certain cases have needed to experience the brunt of law enforcement them-
selves before earning the necessary trust of offenders. For example, Jacobs
(1999) stated that his research on St. Louis drug offenders did not gain
momentum until he was stopped and searched by police at an open-air drug
market, which assured offenders that he had no association with law
enforcement. Granted, researchers can gain access to sensitive populations
through other means: Negative encounters with police are no prerequisite.
However, gaining the required trust of offenders is a hurdle not all research-
ers can overcome (Adler 1993).
The current study contributes to the literature through the SSO of public
drug transactions in Newark, NJ. Similar to prior research, our analysis
focuses on the defensive tactics incorporated by street-level drug sellers.
We build upon prior research by incorporating video footage of narcotics
transactions as a data source, which was recorded by CCTV cameras oper-
ated by the NPD. The footage allows for in-depth observation, and analysis,
of the defensive actions incorporated by drug offenders and follows in the
tradition of prior studies incorporating video footage in SSO (Sampson and
Raudenbush 1999; St. Jean 2007).
Methodology
Study Setting and Data Sources
Newark is the largest city in New Jersey, spanning over 26 square miles
with a population of nearly 280,000 persons. The percentage of residents
living below the poverty level (28 percent) is nearly three times that of New
Jersey as a whole (9.9 percent). Ethnic minorities largely comprise
Newark’s population: 52.4 percent of residents are Black and 33.8 percent
of residents identify themselves as Hispanic or Latino (U.S. Census Bureau
2014). The city has a long-standing reputation as a tumultuous, dangerous
urban environment (Tuttle 2009), with city officials commonly attributing
serious crime problems to the illicit drug trade (Piza and O’Hara 2014:698).
In 2007, the City of Newark installed a public CCTV system, and the
video surveillance unit (VSU) of the NPD has responsibility for the day-
to-day CCTV operations. The system can store and save footage from cam-
era feeds for a period of 30 days. Portions of footage can also be exported
and stored indefinitely on disk. Footage is saved each time VSU monitoring
activity generates probable cause leading to an arrest and includes footage
prior to, during, and following the drug transaction. Following each arrest, a
disk is submitted into evidence and an additional copy is stored at VSU.
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Footage disks are documented within VSU’s video control ledger. The
ledger lists the following for each incident: the case number, the date/
time/location of the incident, the crime observed by the operator, and the
primary arrest charge (if an arrest occurred). From November 2007 through
2011, the time frame for which we had access to the data, the video control
ledger included 1,667 disks. Researchers reviewed the ledger and identified
all incidents with a crime type of drug distribution that resulted in an arrest
for inclusion in this study. Given the clandestine nature of hand-to-hand
drug transactions, it can sometimes be difficult to determine precisely what
was exchanged between parties. The fact that the person on camera was
subsequently arrested and charged with drug distribution provides confir-
mation that the behavior was part of a drug transaction. In total, 200 cases
fit the selection criteria. Due to resource constraints, we focused on the 62
incidents occurring in 2011. Across those 62 incidents, footage amounted to
1,436 minutes of video, with each minute of video footage requiring
approximately 20 minutes of transcription time. This was due to a need
to frequently pause and rewind footage in order to sufficiently describe the
observed activities. The result was approximately 28,720 minutes or nearly
480 hours spent transcribing data. With limited resources at our disposal,
we were simply unable to include more cases in the study.
CCTV Footage as a Data Source
We feel that the observation of drug transactions provides a unique opportu-
nity for the study of the procedural aspects of drug selling. Indeed, research-
ers have previously created video recordings of block faces to study issues of
crime and disorder (e.g., Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; St. Jean 2007).
Such procedures provide the benefit of ‘‘a permanent visual record amenable
to later coding and reinterpretation based on emergent insights’’ (Sampson
and Raudenbush 1999:605). While such recordings were intentionally cre-
ated for research purposes, scholars have argued that preexisting footage, spe-
cifically CCTV-generated footage, can be similarly used in criminology
(Braga and Clarke 2014:492; Mastrofski, Parks, and McClusksy 2010:233).
The utility of CCTV footage as a data source has been demonstrated in
recent research. Levine, Taylor, and Best (2011) used footage from public
CCTV cameras to measure the influence of group size on the escalation
of aggressive behavior to violence. Moeller (2014) used CCTV footage
collected as part of a covert surveillance operation in an open-air drug mar-
ket to analyze temporal patterns of drug transactions. Piza, Caplan, and
Kennedy (2014a) analyzed and coded footage of violent crime incidents
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captured on public CCTV cameras to identify precursor events preceding
serious predatory violence. Considered together, these studies provide sup-
port for the observational analysis of CCTV footage to explore research
questions relating to human behaviors.
Footage Transcriptions
Copies of footage disks were provided to us by the NPD in early 2013. As
per NPD policy, CCTV operators focus closely on individuals in suspected
drug transactions for the purpose of identifying the possession and
exchange of drugs and money. Visual confirmation of drug activity is
required before operators can report the behavior as a drug transaction to
police. This operator activity combined with the telescopic quality of the
cameras allowed for in-depth observation of the incidents (see Figure 1),
which enabled us to readily identify objects in the video as packages of
drugs or money.
The footage was in a proprietary format, unable to be inputted into any
third-party software for coding. Therefore, detailed transcriptions using
SSO were created for each incident. First advanced by Reiss (1968,
1971), SSO involves the observation of social phenomena in a systematic,
replicable manner, involving a means of observation that is independent of
the phenomena being observed. SSO is especially well suited to situations
‘‘where all of the relevant actors and events . . . can be observed from start
to finish in a limited, well-defined time period’’ (Mastrofski et al.
2010:228). Street-level drug sales, as recorded by CCTV operators, are well
suited for SSO.
To prepare for coding and transcription, coder training consisted of both
the authors of this article transcribing and coding 10 full incidents together.
Authors actively discussed how to best articulate and code the activities tak-
ing place on screen, until general saturation of potential uncertainties was
met. If uncertainties arose thereafter, authors watched the footage numerous
times together and discussed the incident until an agreement was reached.
Following training, the second author of this article led the remaining
footage observation and coding efforts to ensure consistency. However, the
primary author did transcribe and code 19 percent of incidents. Maxfield
and Babbie (2015) recommend that if there are multiple coders, measures
should be independently coded and compared. Thus, interrater reliability
was tested in a manner similar to that of Rosenfeld, Bray, and Egley
(1999). Of the 19 percent of cases transcribed and coded by the primary
author, 25 percent were coded independently by the primary coder. Using
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the QSR NVivo software package (version 10) coding comparison feature,
percentage of agreement was calculated on all variable attributes for those
cases coded by both researchers. Coders were in agreement an average of
97.6 percent of the time across all attributes under study, with a mean k
coefficient of .85, which is considered substantial in the literature (see
Landis and Koch 1977 for a general guideline to interpreting k values).
Transcriptions were organized by one-minute intervals, with behaviors
of all actors described in detail. The following is a portion of a transcription:
Figure 1. Screen captures of example closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage
incident. Note: Faces of all persons were intentionally distorted by the research team
to ensure privacy.
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14:29 Camera operator is observing a house with four males on the front
porch. The group consists of male A (Black, young, mid to late teens), male
B (Black, young, mid to late teens), male C (Black, young, mid to late teens),
and male D (Black, young, mid-teens to early 20s). Male A is standing at the
top of the steps eating something. Male B is sitting at the top of the steps.
Male C is currently walking out of the gate away from the porch area. Male
D is standing on the left side of the porch, leaning on the handrail. Male C
walks across the street out of camera view. Male D then walks out of the gate
and away from the house toward the left of the home. Male D stops next to a
large bush and bends over. He appears to pick something up from the bush, at
this time previously unseen male (male E, Black, early 30s) is walking up
toward the house and male D hands something to male E in exchange for what
appears to be money.
14:30 Male E immediately walks away. Male E returns quickly and meets
male D again near the corner. Male E hands something to male D. Male D
then walks over to the bush and places something into his left back pocket
with his left hand and places something in the bush with his right hand. Male
D pulls something out from the bush. The item male D has in his right hand
seems to be wrapped in a transparent plastic of some sort. Male D then looks
through the package and walks back to the bush. Male D bends over again and
seems to pick something up. Male D then walks past the bush about 10 feet
away while holding something in his left hand. Male D surveys the sidewalk
area, and then picks up a large rock. He then places the package under the
rock and places the rock on the package to hide it. Male D then walks back
to the house where male A and male B are still talking.
Following the transcriptions, we realized that while the continuous foo-
tage on a disk was considered a single incident by the NPD, numerous
transactions were often captured. This led us to designate the individual nar-
cotics transactions captured within footage incidents as units of analysis.
We used Jacques and Wright’s (2011:731) definition of a drug transaction
(which they termed a ‘‘drug trade’’): ‘‘a reciprocal giving and taking of
resources between actors. Drug selling is concerned with trading drugs for
resources, and drug buying is concerned with trading resources for drugs.’’
Transactions were operationalized as the moment when the buyer and
dealer made contact through the moment when the buyer and dealer went
separate ways after the exchange of drugs and money. There were 92 indi-
vidual transactions across the 62 incidents. Each of the drug markets cap-
tured in the footage can be considered open markets, publicly accessible
places open to any buyer (Hough and Natarajan 2000:4), as well as retail
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markets, hosting primarily small-scale transactions ‘‘between a seller
and an ultimate consumer’’ (Eck 1995:69). All offenders fit Johnson and
Natarajan’s (1995) definition of drug sellers, and Johnson et al.’s (2000)
definition of retail sellers: offenders who engage in street-level sales of
small quantities of drugs. For consistency purposes, we refer to subjects
in our study as drug sellers throughout this article.
Data Coding
Following the transcription of each event, the text was coded within the
QSR NVivo software package (version 10) to identify pertinent beha-
viors of the drug sellers. Individual transactions were identified within
each incident. We coded descriptive aspects of each transaction. First,
information was collected on the transaction participants, including the
race, gender, age of sellers and buyers, and the number of sellers and
buyers involved. Second, we noted the land use setting in which the
transaction occurred. All occurred within two settings: commercial
areas, exclusively comprised of businesses and storefronts, and mixed-
residential areas, comprised of residential housing alongside storefronts.
Third, we recorded the time of day using two specific categories: day-
time and evening. Evening was considered any time after sunset, when
offenders were afforded the cover of darkness.2
For purposes of the analysis, we coded sections of text to measure specific
defensive actions enacted by the drug sellers, as described subsequently.
Seller partners. To get a sense of cooperation across multiple actors, we
coded instances where more than one individual was involved in the sale.
Specifically, we noted the presence of carriers, defined as individuals
who held drugs or money for the primary drug seller, and runners, who
delivered drugs and/or money between the primary seller and the buyer.
We coded this variable as none in transactions where a single dealer con-
ducted the sale alone.
Exchange speed. We also noted the speed with which the transaction
occurred. Any transaction in which the initial exchange of drugs or money
was not immediately followed by the reciprocal exchange of drugs or
money was coded as delayed. Specifically, delayed captured when a seller
or buyer took time to physically examine the goods or currency before com-
mitting their part of the exchange. Transactions in which the exchange
occurred absent any such delay were coded as immediate.
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Transaction mobility. We considered each transaction as containing three
distinct phases: the greeting between the seller and buyer, the exchange
of money, and the exchange of drugs. Each of these phases can potentially
occur in a different place within the drug market. In total, four different
combinations were observed, and coded, within the current study: the
greeting, money exchange, and drug exchange occurring at the same place
(G1, M1, D1); the greeting and money exchange occurring at the same
place with the drug exchange occurring at a different place (G1, M1,
D2); the greeting occurring at one place and the money and drug
exchanges occurring simultaneously at a different place (G1, M2, D2),
and the greeting, money exchange, and drug exchange each occurring at
a unique place (G1, M2, D3).
Transactional mediation schemes. We observed three types of transactional
schemes. Legitimate context refers to transactions conducted in a manner
that suggests the buyer and seller are engaged in a noncriminal activity,
such as while sitting together at a bus shelter. Props refer to instances where
drugs and/or money are placed in an object rather than exchanged hand-to-
hand. Public cuts refers to transactions that occur in publicly accessible
places that have a private dimension by being partially obscured from sight,
such as within alleyways or spaces between buildings. Transactions not
involving a transactional scheme were coded as none.
Stash spots. We coded two different types of stash spots: off-person stash
spots, in which the seller keeps the bulk of their drug inventory in a prox-
imate location, and on-person stash spots, which involve sellers holding
drugs on their person, but in a location unlikely to be detected during a
police-initiated terry pat, such as inside of underwear. All transactions in
which sellers kept drugs in a readily accessible area of their person (e.g.,
pockets) were coded as on-dealer.
Analytical Strategy
Given the qualitative nature of the data and the lack of statistical power due
to small cell sizes, frequencies were calculated for each of the identified
defensive actions to distinguish popular tactics from those seldom used.
In addition, we measured whether the frequency of particular tactics was
influenced by setting (commercial or mixed residential) or time of day (day-
time or evening). Fisher’s exact tests were conducted to measure the
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statistical significance of these relationships.3 We report Cramer’s V as a
measure of effect size.4
Descriptive Statistics
When descriptive statistics were calculated (see Table 1), it was found that
the 92 separate transactions involved 200 individual actors. Of the 200 total
actors observed, 99 were sellers and 101 were buyers. The majority of both
buyers (n ¼ 66) and sellers (n ¼ 89) were Black males. When White males
were observed (n ¼ 15), they were typically buyers (n ¼ 14) rather than
sellers. Of the 24 females observed, they were also more often seen purchas-
ing drugs (n¼ 14) and tended to be Black (n¼ 21). The predominate invol-
vement of Blacks (87.5 percent of participants) fits within the context of the
study setting. The 24 census block groups encompassing the drug markets
viewed in this study have a mean Black population of 58.9 percent and a
standard deviation of 38.3.5
The 200 actors were involved in the transactions in various group con-
figurations. The most common configuration was a single buyer engaged
in a transaction with a seller at the scene with a larger group of people
(n ¼ 43). Following this, transactions involving a single buyer interacting
with a single seller was the most frequently observed (n ¼ 32). Eight trans-
actions involved multiple buyers and a seller within a group, and six
involved multiple buyers and a single seller. In three transactions, the group
configuration was unable to be determined due to the buyers being within
motor vehicles, preventing researchers from observing the number of peo-
ple involved. In transactions coded as multiple buyers, each person interact-
ing with the seller participated in the exchange, by passing money to the
seller and/or accepting narcotics from the dealer (or from another buyer,
after the initial exchange). However, persons observed with sellers during
transactions often did not show any evidence of direct involvement. We
coded such instances as seller in a larger group rather than multiple sellers
because a person being in the company of a drug seller was not universally
indicative of involvement in the drug trade.
We estimated the age of all participants using the physical characteristics
discernable via the CCTV footage. The majority of actors appeared to fall
within the late teens to early 30s range (n ¼ 131), with there being a fairly
even split of late teens–early 20s (n ¼ 68) and mid-20s–early 30s (n ¼ 63).
Sellers appeared to be predominately late teens–early 20s (n¼ 47), with the
mid-20s–early 30s (n ¼ 39) a close second. Buyers appeared to range from
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late teens–early 50s with no single dominate group. There were almost no
actors either in their early teens or older than 50 years.
Of the 92 transactions under study, commercial settings were most often
observed (n¼ 55), although mixed-residential settings were also quite com-
mon (n ¼ 41). While transactions most frequently occurred during the eve-
ning (n ¼ 52), daytime transactions were not uncommon (n ¼ 40).
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Race/gender Buyer Seller Total
Black female 14 7 21
Black male 66 89 154
White female 2 0 2
White male 14 1 15
Female, race unknown 1 0 1
Male, race unknown 1 0 1
Unknown race and gender 3 2 5
Total 101 99 200
Age
Early teens 1 1 2
Late teens–early 20s 21 47 68
Mid 20s–early 30s 24 39 63
Mid 30s–early 40s 26 9 35
Mid 40s–early 50s 23 2 25
Older than 50 3 1 4
Unknown age 3 0 3
Total 101 99 200
Group configurations Number
Multiple buyers, seller in group 8 (8.7%)
Multiple buyers, single seller 6 (6.5%)
Single buyer, seller in group 43 (46.7%)
Single buyer, single seller 32 (34.8%)




Mixed residential 41 (40.2%)
Total 92 (100%)
Time of day
Daytime (before sunset) 40 (43.5%)
Evening (after sunset) 52 (56.5%)
Total 92 (100%)
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Findings
Findings of the seller partners, exchange speed, and transaction mobility
models appear in Table 2. Overall, sellers were rarely observed relying on
partners to engage in transactions. Eighty-three transactions (90.2 percent)
involved the seller working alone. In the rare cases (n ¼ 9) where partners
were observed, the partner was most often a runner (n ¼ 6). Interestingly, all
nine cases of seller partners occurred during evening hours. The relationship
between partners and time of day was statistically significant. While all but
one of the partner transactions occurred in commercial rather than mixed-
residential settings, the relationship was not statistically significant. Despite
the infrequency of seller partners, the evening hours had an appreciable effect
on the use of both carriers and runners in drug transactions.
Table 2. Fisher’s Exact Test Findings: Seller Partners, Exchange Speed, and Trans-
action Mobility.
Defensive action N
Setting Time of day
Commercial Mixed residential Daytime Evening
Seller partners
Carriers 3 3 (1.8) 0 (1.2) 0 (1.3) 3 (1.7)
None 83 47 (49.6) 36 (33.4) 40 (36.1) 43 (46.9)
Runners 6 5 (3.6) 1 (2.4) 0 (2.6) 6 (3.4)




Delayed 22 9 (13.2) 13 (8.8) 5 (9.8) 17 (12.2)





G1, M1, D1 63 37 (37.5) 26 (25.5) 32 (28.3) 31 (34.7)
G1, M1, D2 3 2 (1.8) 1 (1.2) 0 (1.3) 3 (1.7)
G1, M2, D2 18 11 (10.7) 7 (7.3) 7 (8.1) 11 (9.9)
G1, M2, D3 5 3 (3.0) 2 (2.0) 1 (2.2) 4 (2.8)
Total 89 53 36 40 49
p 1.00 .22
V .03 .23
Note: Expected frequencies within parentheses.
*p  .05.
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Transactions were most often observed to occur immediately (n ¼ 68)
and immediate transactions were more likely to occur in commercial areas
(n ¼ 45) regardless of time of day. Delayed transactions most commonly
occurred in mixed-residential areas and during evening hours. Both the set-
ting and time-of-day relationships were statistically significant. Cramer’s V
values identify the effect size as moderate.
Most transactions (n ¼ 63) lacked any mobility by the participants.
When mobility was observed, it generally consisted of parties greeting one
another at a first location and then moving to a second location where both
money and drugs were exchanged (n¼ 18). This form of mobility was more
often observed in commercial areas and during the evening hours, though
those relationships were nonsignificant. Instances in which the exchange
of money and drugs occurred at different locations were rare (n ¼ 8). Set-
ting or time of day did not have any significant effect on mobility.
Table 3 displays the findings of the transactional schemes and stash spot
models. For the overwhelming majority of transactions (n ¼ 75), no trans-
actional schemes were used. That said, there was a moderate and significant
relationship between setting and transactional schemes. All but one incident
of legitimate context occurred within mixed-residential areas. Public cuts,
Table 3. Fisher’s Exact Test Findings: Transactional Schemes and Stash Spot.
Defensive action N
Setting Time of day
Commercial Mixed-residential Daytime Evening
Transactional schemes
Legitimate context 6 1 (3.6) 5 (2.4) 1 (2.6) 5 (3.4)
Props 3 1 (1.8) 2 (1.2) 1 (1.3) 2 (1.7)
Public cuts 8 8 (4.8) 0 (3.2) 4 (3.5) 4 (4.5)
None 75 45 (44.8) 30 (30.2) 34 (32.6) 41 (42.4)




On dealer 55 44 (34.4) 12 (21.6) 26 (25.5) 30 (30.5)
Off-person stash 22 1 (13.5) 21 (8.5) 11 (10.0) 11 (12.0)
On-person stash 10 9 (6.1) 1 (3.9) 3 (4.5) 7 (5.5)
Total 88 54 34 40 48
p .00*** .56
V .68 .12
Note: Expected frequencies within parentheses.
**p < .01; ***p < .001.
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on the other hand, occurred exclusively in commercial areas. No significant
relationship was observed for time of day.
The majority of transactions did not involve the use of stash spots, with
sellers holding the drugs in an easily accessible place on their person (n ¼
55). However, stash spots were not uncommon and were used in 32 trans-
actions. Off-person stash spots were the most commonly observed type (n¼
22). A statistically significant relationship was observed between the use of
specific types of stash spots and setting. All but one instance of off-person
stash spots occurred in mixed-residential areas. The opposite relationship
was observed with on-person stashes, with all but one of these actions
occurring within commercial areas. The effect size of this relationship was
strong, exhibiting the largest Cramer’s V value in this study (.68).
Discussion
The defensive actions of the drug sellers show that they operate in a manner
that minimizes their detection by potential controllers in the drug market.
Foremost, the defensive actions can be considered as safeguards against
police. However, they also can be considered as protection against non-
law enforcement place managers who provide surveillance over the drug
market. Research has demonstrated that place managers produce a crime
control effect through their informal presence and include persons such
as business owners, employees, community residents, and pedestrians (Eck
1994; Felson 1995; Mazorelle, Kadleck, and Roehl 1998). This suggests the
possibility that defensive actions observed in this study may be as much a
protection against the natural surveillance offered by place managers as a
protection against direct apprehension by police.
Similar to Jacques and Reynald (2012), our findings suggest that drug
sellers also directly adopt situational prevention techniques by acting as
controllers on their own behalf. For example, the use of stash spots may
allow a drug seller to better serve as a guardian over drugs and/or proceeds
(i.e., target). This is further illustrated by the observed effect of setting on
the specific stash spot employed. To review, all but one instance of off-
person stash spots occurred in mixed-residential areas, while all but one
instance of on-person stash spots occurred within commercial areas. Given
the increased foot traffic in commercial areas, the use of an on-person stash
spot provides a much more secure form of guardianship than an off-person
stash spot in such settings. The fact that nearly 63 percent (55 of 88) of
transactions did not involve a stash spot also supports the notion of guar-
dianship. Specifically, the decision to forego a stash spot may be reflective
54 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 53(1)
 by guest on December 31, 2015jrc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
of a paradox inherent in their use; while they protect dealers from harsher
sanction in the event of apprehension, stash spots also present the risk of hav-
ing drugs stolen since sellers do not possess their inventory for extended peri-
ods of time. As one dealer interviewed by Jacobs (1999:82) offered, ‘‘If they
[fellow sellers] find out where it is, you best believe you won’t have your shit
no more.’’ In this context, not using a stash spot allows drug sellers to better
provide guardianship over their inventory. This may explain why sellers most
frequently opted to either bypass stash spots or use an on-person stash spot in
commercial areas. Since mixed-residential areas have lower levels of natural
surveillance, due to reduced foot traffic, guardianship concerns may not be as
high, leading to more frequent use of off-person stash spots.
The influence of setting and time of day on exchange speed is also tell-
ing. Since a distinguishing feature of commercial areas is a high level of
both vehicle and pedestrian traffic, perhaps immediate transactions were
more important in this context, given the increased likelihood of potential
onlookers. Perhaps the lower frequency of crowds in mixed-residential
areas made immediate sales less necessary. Conversely, the low street traf-
fic may have allowed sellers and buyers to maximize guardianship, specif-
ically by allowing time for inspection of the currency and product prior to
exchange. In fast-paced situations, such as those typical in commercial
areas, participants are likely not afforded the time to take such precautions
(Agar 1973; Mieczkowski 1992). Similar cover may have been provided by
the darkness of evening, explaining the more frequent use of delayed trans-
actions during these times of the day.
In addition to guardians, drug sellers seemed to take the role of place
managers through the use of transactional schemes, which were more often
observed within commercial areas. By requiring sellers to engage in a trans-
action via the use of a scheme, drug sellers may have manipulated the nature
and flow of human behavior in a manner that eschewed both formal and nat-
ural surveillance. In those instances where transaction schemes were used,
offenders seemed to directly incorporate the spatial features of a drug mar-
ket (e.g., a bus stop or take-out eatery). In addition, public cuts occurred
exclusively in commercial areas where there is not only a large amount
of vehicle and foot traffic but also a greater number of public cuts that exist
within commercial areas by design, affording greater opportunity to rely on
such facilities.
Since mixed-residential areas provided less of a threat in regard to natural
surveillance, place management may have been less important in this setting.
However, it is possible that the general nature of the mixed-residential areas
under observation may have provided sufficient opportunities for place
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management, thus rendering the use of transactional schemes less important.
In this sense, St. Jean (2007:20) reported that drug sellers in Chicago expli-
citly selected locations that offered the opportunity for deniability, ‘‘the abil-
ity to deny that one is present in the area solely to participate in the exchange
of drugs or sex for money.’’ Drug sellers reported that features such as busy
intersections, corner stores, liquor establishments, and public transit, among
others (see St. Jean 2007:chapter 5), allowed them to actively engage in nar-
cotics sales while simultaneously ‘‘blending in’’ with the general behavior
patterns of noncriminal pedestrians within the market. Indeed, quantitative
analyses have found that the presence of certain features significantly contri-
butes to both the presence and size of illicit drug markets (McCord and
Ratcliffe 2007; Rengert, Ratcliffe, and Chakravorty 2005). Therefore, drug
sellers may not need to directly utilize the facilities in the drug market to
obtain deniability if the environmental composition of the market already
provides such.
The differential use of drug selling partners by time of day, with more
frequent use of partners occurring during evening hours, also reflects the
notion of place management. By using partners, a drug seller manipulates
the activity of drug buyers by mandating that they consult with different
people, at different moments in time, to conduct specific aspects of a trans-
action. Furthermore, the use of selling partners may be as much a defense
against criminal victimization as apprehension by police. Drug offenders
are particularly attractive victims for robbery, since they are typically sta-
tionary in public places, have ready cash, and generally will not report
crimes to the police (Jacobs 1999; Lauritsen, Sampson, and Laub 1991).
Since violent crime in Newark, especially robbery (see Piza and O’Hara
2014), is most prominent during evening hours, sellers may have been most
concerned with controlling the flow of activity (by using partners in the
transaction) when they were most at risk.
Due to the nature of the data, the analysis was not able to explore the role
of handlers in the drug trade. However, since the places under observation
were busy open-air drug markets, perhaps community characteristics meant
that handlers were ineffective in controlling drug sellers in the first place.
Felson (1995) explains the notion of handlers as a two-step process of con-
trol theory (Hirschi 1969). In the first step, society attaches a ‘‘handle’’ to
each individual by which those in the community can ‘‘grasp’’ the individ-
ual and impose social control. The second step of this process involves
‘‘identifying exactly who is breaking the rules’’ (Felson 1995:54). This may
be difficult in some contexts, as certain communities provide plentiful
opportunity to evade social control through the lack of cohesion among
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community members. Felson’s (1995) argument points to the importance of
community cohesion in enacting social control, which echoes the research
on collective efficacy, defined as social cohesion and shared expectations
for social control (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997).
Certain studies have found that sellers work in partnerships in drug mar-
kets (Johnson and Natarajan 1995; St. Jean 2007), while others, like this
one, have reported that single seller operations are quite common (Coomber
and Maher 2006; Jacobs 1999; Sales and Murphy 2007). Commonly
referred to as freelance distribution, such situations are defined by the lack
of a formal hierarchy and the absence of a division of labor across a group
(Curtis and Wendell 2000:132). Even when multiple sellers have been pres-
ent within the same drug market, prior research subjects have largely
claimed to be freelance dealers. For example, Jacobs (1999:49) quoted a
crack seller as saying the following: ‘‘We sell by ourself, but we all out
together . . . My partners, they all be outside, but I’m not really slangin’
with them. Anywhere I stand, somebody gonna be ‘round [but I sell by
myself].’’ Such findings help to explain the relation between our descriptive
statistics and seller partner findings, specifically by contextualizing why so
little partnership was observed despite the fact that over half (55.4 percent)
of the transactions involved a seller within a larger group. In addition, much
prior research has identified stash spots as a nearly universal tactic of drug
sellers. For example, Johnson and Natarajan (1995) reported that nearly all
of the 120 drug offenders included in their study reported using stash spots,
with Jacques and Reynald (2012) also finding stash spots to be a commonly
employed strategy. That said, the focus of these studies was not exclusively
open-air markets, as it is here. The less frequent use of stash spots in the
current study may be explained by factors identified in other research.
St. Jean (2007), for example, reported that sellers with more sophisticated
operations, involving partners and/or transaction schemes, were much more
likely to report the use of stash spots than less sophisticated sellers. In this
sense, the infrequent use of seller partners and transactional schemes may
explain the less-than-usual use of stash spots.
Implications and Conclusion
From a policy perspective, the findings of this study indicate that place-
based narcotics strategies should not be incorporated in a one-size-fits-all
manner but should rather account for situational context. For example,
focusing exclusively on the primary drug seller may be beneficial in com-
mercial settings, since the stash of narcotics is typically kept on the seller’s
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person (or in an on-person stash) in such areas. However, in mixed-
residential settings, police should be more mindful of the surrounding area,
since off-person stash spots were more common in this setting. The use of
partners (carriers and runners) was much more prevalent during the eve-
ning, meaning that police officers working at night should be mindful of the
increased risk for team-based narcotics transactions during their shifts. Offi-
cers who exclusively patrol residential areas in the evening should be aware
of activities such as delayed transactions, and thus may have to wait out a
potentially lengthy transaction prior to making an arrest. In addition, the
findings suggest that police could better leverage the activity of CCTV
operators in crime control strategies. Recent research suggests that granting
CCTV operators the authority to immediately dispatch patrol officers to
observed incidents of concern can generate significant reductions in
street-level crime (Piza et al. 2015). This study suggests that intelligence
gathered by CCTV operators can also be used in investigative strategies. The
CCTV footage at our disposal led us to identify many situational and con-
textual factors of drug markets, which could be used to proactively address
drug crime by a variety of police personnel, such as patrol officers, narcotics
detectives, and code enforcement officials, to name a few. CCTV operators
could conceivably uncover information similar (or superior) in scope to our
findings during their normal course of duty. Such information could be sys-
tematically collected and used according to the recently advanced case of
places approach, which emphasizes that law enforcement agencies should
devote as many resources to investigating problem places as they do investi-
gating crime suspects (Lum and Koper 2012; Tate et al. 2013).
CCTV as a data source offers a form of SSO that avoids some limitations
of depending solely on offender interviews. In addition, the access to foo-
tage allowed sufficient time for in-depth coding and analysis of seller beha-
vior and the exploration of how setting and time of day effect seller actions.
Similar to Jacques and Reynald (2012), the findings suggest that the same
theoretical framework used in the formation of situationally focused crime
prevention interventions helps explain the defensive actions enacted by
drug sellers. In addition, our findings demonstrate that offender decision-
making is not a static process, but rather varies according to the drug market
setting and time of day. Exploring the effect of additional situational factors
is a future avenue of research suggested by the current findings.
Despite these implications, the current study, like most research, has spe-
cific limitations that warrant mentioning. For one, the use of CCTV footage
as a data source obviously limited our observations of defensive tactics to
physical activities. Prior research has consistently found that drug sellers
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utilize verbal cues to determine whether buyers are undercover law enforce-
ment agents (Jacobs 1993; Johnson and Natarajan 1995) and verbal codes of
communication with fellow sellers that are difficult to understand by unfa-
miliar onlookers (Jacques and Reynald 2012; Johnson and Natarajan 1995).
Such actions were not measured in this study. The focus of the CCTV cam-
eras also presented some restrictions. As per NPD policy, Newark’s CCTV
operators maintain continuous focus on the offender in each incident to
ensure that officers receive real-time information regarding the location
of the offender and potential escape routes. By focusing on the seller, the
operator may have missed the presence of selling partners who were not
in immediate proximity of the seller. Indeed, drug selling partners are
known to use cell phones or walkie-talkies (Curtis and Wendel 2000;
McEwen 2010) in order to collaborate from a distance. Finally, since this
study only included incidents resulting in arrest, our findings may be
restricted to arrested drug sellers rather than drug sellers in general. How-
ever, the vast majority of research on drug offenders has incorporated conve-
nience or snowball sampling methods, which prevent their generalizability as
well. Nevertheless, we caution readers against applying our findings to the
general drug selling population.
Despite these limitations, we feel this study positively contributes to the
literature. The findings distinguished between high-frequency and low-
frequency seller tactics and demonstrated the effect of specific situational
characteristics on the use of said tactics. In addition, the study follows
recent calls to improve the understanding of crime (Braga and Clarke
2014; Mastrofski et al. 2010) by using a novel data collection instrument
(CCTV) in the study of drug selling. Future research can incorporate this
methodology in concert with more traditional ethnographic techniques in
the study of the drug trade and in crime-and-place studies in general.
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Notes
1. There is some obvious overlap between these categories. For example, in addi-
tion to guardians, police may be considered as place managers since their
enforcement activity may produce changes in the behavior and activity of people
within drug markets. This reflects the unavoidable overlap inherent in the anal-
ysis of crime from a situational perspective (Clarke 1997:17).
2. Since data were coded within the text narrations, and not from the video footage,
researchers had to manually determine whether the transaction occurred after
sunset. For most incidents, this was easily determined: for example, an 11 a.m.
transaction was obviously daytime and a 10 p.m. transaction was obviously eve-
ning. However, determining evening times was less straightforward in certain
cases (e.g., 6:30 p.m. during a winter month). To ensure that evening cases were
correctly identified and coded, dates and times of each transaction were refer-
enced on the history archives of the Weather Underground website (wunder-
ground.com/history). For each day in question, the time of the Nautical
Twilight was recorded, which Weather Underground defines as the time at which
‘‘ordinary outdoor activities are not possible . . . without extra illumination.’’
The transaction was coded as evening if it occurred after this time.
3. Fisher’s exact tests were conducted rather than chi-square because of the pres-
ence of cells with expected counts less than five. However, chi-square produced
nearly identical results.
4. For each model, all transactions coded as unknown, meaning the researcher was
unable to make a determination, were excluded. This was done to prevent the
presence of unknown cases from influencing the results, specifically from Fish-
er’s exact test treating unknown as a nominal value in the analysis. Since the
unknown cases differed across models, each of the analyses had a different N.
However, the vast majority of cases were included in each analysis. The highest
number of excluded cases was five, in the Stash Spots model. With N ¼ 88, this
sample size is sufficient for the analysis and is larger than or comparable to prior
studies of drug seller behavior (e.g., Coomber and Maher 2006; Jacobs 1993; Jac-
ques and Reynald 2012; Jacques and Wright 2011; Taylor 2007).
5. These micro-level statistics were calculated via Geographic Information Sys-
tems (GIS) mapping processes. GIS shapefiles and accompanying demo-
graphic tables for the census block groups in Essex County (the
encompassing county of Newark) were downloaded from the U.S. Census
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Bureau’s TIGER (http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/tiger.html) and
American Fact Finder (http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/sear-
chresults.xhtml?refresh¼t) websites. Researchers then identified which block
groups intersected the closed-circuit television viewsheds (areas visible to a
camera; see Piza, Caplan, and Kennedy 2014b for a more in-depth descrip-
tion) of cameras that provided footage for this study via the select by loca-
tion function in ArcGIS 10.2.2. The population statistics reported in this
article were calculated from the 24 block groups identified via this process.
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